Criminal Procedure: Circuit Court Refuses to Extend “Poison Fruit” Doctrine to Testimony of Witness Discovered as a Result of Illegal Detention by unknown
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CIRCUIT COURT REFUSES TO
EXTEND "POISON FRUIT" DOCTRINE TO TESTIMONY
OF WITNESS DISCOVERED AS A RESULT OF ILLEGAL
DETENTION
SINCE the famous Weeks1 case established the rule excluding evi-
dence obtained from an illegal search and seizure from trials in the
federal courts, the principles stated therein have developed apace
to an ever widening application.2 In Smith v. United States,3 how-
ever, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia re-
fused to extend the exclusionary doctrine to testimony of an eye-
witness to a crime who was discovered as a result of clues obtained
from defendants while they were illegally detained.
Testimony indicated that Miksa Merson was struck from behind
and robbed by unknown assailants. The victim died shortly there-
after, and the police had few clues. About a week later, defendants
Smith and Bowden were arrested in connection with another rob-
bery in the area of the killing. Upon failure of the victim of the
second robbery to identify either of the suspects, Bowden, a juvenile,
was released, but Smith was detained to be included in a line-up the
next morning. The homicide officer assigned to the Merson case was
present at this line-up and suspected a connection between Smith
and the Merson killing. Bowden was subsequently picked up for
questioning. During the interrogation defendants confessed and
cited clues ultimately leading the police to eyewitness Holman.4 The
trial court excluded the confessions but permitted Holman to testi-
fy. 5 Following conviction, appeal was taken on the ground that the
testimony of Holman was improper since he was found as a result
of information obtained while defendants were illegally detained in
'Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
See generally, McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE §§ 118, 139-42 (1954); 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§§ 2184a, b (McNaughton rev. 1961); 2 VARON, SEARCHES, SEIZuRES AND IMMUNITIES chs.
XIII, XVII (1961).
324 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
'Apparently witness Holman had accompanied Smith and Bowden on their lawless
venture. Id. at 880-81, 883 n.4.
r Smith's confession was excluded under the rule of Mallory v. United States, 354
U.S. 449 (1957), excluding confessions taken during illegal detention. Bowden, a
juvenile, came under the rule of Harling v. United States, 295 F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir.
1961), excluding a minor's admissions to police before juvenile court had waived its
exclusive jurisdiction.
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violation of rule 5 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.6
The Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the admissibility of Holman's
testimony on the grounds of lack of precedent for exclusion under
these circumstances and the attenuated connection between the con-
fession and the testimony in the trial court.7
Under traditional common law rules evidence was not excluded
from trial solely on the basis of the methods used by police in ob-
taining it.8 Under the modern federal rules, however, there have
been several controversial lines of cases excluding otherwise admis-
sible evidence from trial on the ground of improper police investi-
gative methods.
Weeks v. United States9 is traditionally considered the leading
case excluding evidence acquired during an illegal search and
seizure. Subsequently, Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States0
went beyond the mere exclusion of the immediate fruits of the
illegal search to inaugurate the so-called "poison fruit doctrine" ex-
cluding evidence coming to the knowledge of the police as a result
of having acquired the illegally obtained evidence. The recent case
of Wong Sun v. United States" reaffirms the Silverthorne doctrine
0 FED. R. CRiM. P. 5 (a) provides: "An officer making an arrest under a warrant
issued upon a complaint or any person making an arrest without a warrant shall
take the arrested person without unnecessary delay before the nearest available com-
missioner or before any other nearby officer empowered to commit persons charged
with offenses against the laws of the United States." The defendant also contended it
was error to admit in evidence Smith's palm print obtained from him the day before
trial, which corresponded with the palm print on the victim's car registration card.
324 F.2d at 881. The Court of Appeals, however, considered the taking of the palm
print part of the routine identification process during lawful custody and not related
to the illegal detention. Id. at 882; cf. United States v. Bynum, 274 F.2d 767 (D.C.
Cir. 1960) (per curiam).
7324 F.2d at 881. The court settled the lack of precedent ground by stating that
"no case as yet has held that a jury should be denied the testimony of an eyewitness
to a crime because of the circumstances in which his existence and identity was
learned." Ibid. This statement is not completely accurate. See note 12 infra. The
"attenuated connection" results from interposing the human personality of the witness
between the unlawful police action and the eventual testimony. 324 F.2d at 881 n.2.
' See MCCORMICK, op. cit. supra note 2, § 137; 8 WscMoRa, EVIDENCE § 2184 (3d ed.
1940); Wigmore, Using Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure, 8 A.B.A.J.
479 (1922).
0 232 U.S. 383 (1914). For many years the Weeks doctrine did not apply to evi-
dence presented for use in state courts. Today, however, the exclusionary rules in
relation to search and seizure have been extended to apply to the states. See Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962
DuKE L.J. 319.
10251 U.S. 385 (1920).
1 371 U.S. 471 (1963), 49 A.B.A.J. 285 (1963), 51 CALIF. L. REv. 637 (1963), 51
Vol. 1964: 620]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
and makes it clear that there is no logical reason to distinguish be-
tween physical and verbal evidence. While there are no federal cases
directly holding that testimony of an eyewitness to a crime should be
excluded as "poison fruit" merely because the witness was found
through the use of illegally obtained evidence, two states have done
so, citing Silverthorne and other federal cases as authority.12
A second exclusionary development has been accomplished by
the Supreme Court in relation to wire-tapping'3 under section 605
of the Federal Communications Act of 1934.14 Reliance on the
statute as the foundation for exclusion became necessary with the
rejection of the argument that wire-taps fell under the constitutional
prohibition against illegal search and seizure. 5 The prohibition
against trial use of evidence secured indirectly or derivatively from
wire-taps extended the Silverthorne rule into this new area.10 It is
in connection with wire-tapping activities that one would expect to
find cases directly in point as to whether a witness discovered through
the use of illegally obtained information would be permitted to testi-
fy. However, this is not the case. It seems that no one has speculated
on whether this natural breeding ground for finding prosecution
witnesses remains unlitigated because of difficulty in proving how
witnesses are discovered or from an assumption that such evidence
would be clearly excluded. The general Nardone rule that wire-tap
information cannot be used derivatively to acquire evidence has been
construed by one prominent writer to mean that testimony of a
GEO. L.J. 838 (1963), 31 GEO. WASH. L. Rrv. 851 (1963), 77 HARV. L. REv. 117 (1963),
42 N.C.L. REv. 219 (1963), 46 NEB. L. REv. 483 (1963), 2 WASHBURN L.J. 292 (1963).
12 People v. Mickelson, 59 Cal.2d 448, 380 P.2d 658 (1963) (Traynor J.); People v.
Schaumloffel, 53 Cal.2d 96, 346 P.2d 393 (1959); People v. Mills, 148 Cal. App. 2d
392, 306 P.2d 1005 (Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 841 (1957); People v. Albea,
2 Ill. 2d 317, 118 N.E.2d 277 (1954), 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1121 (1955); People v. Schinoll,
383 Ill. 280, 48 N.E.2d 933 (1943); People v. Martin, 382 Ill. 192, 46 N.E.2d 997 (1942).
The Schaumloffel case is particularly interesting since it involved a definite chain of
causation. The police made an illegal search of a doctor's office and took some cards
with names on them. One card led to witness Edgar. Edgar in turn informed the
police about witnesses Watts and Justen. The California Supreme Court affirmed
the holding that testimony of all three witnesses must be excluded as "poisonous fruit."
23 Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937); see Rosenzweig, The Law of Wire
Tapping, 32 CoRaN.L L.Q. 514 (1947); 33 CORNELL L.Q. 73 (1947); Westin, The Wire.
Tapping Problem: An Analysis and a Legislative Proposal, 52 COLUM. L, REv. 165
(1952); 8 WiGMORE, op. cit. supra note 2, § 2184b.
14 48 Stat. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1958).
15 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
10 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939); see Bernstein, The Fruit of the
Poisonous Tree, 37 ILL. L. REV. 99 (1942).
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witness discovered by wire-tap information would be excluded.17 He
came to the same conclusion about testimony of a witness induced
to testify by confronting him with wire-tap information, provided
the defendant had standing to object.' 8 This conclusion as to using
wire-tap information to accomplish police coercion of witnesses was
drawn by implication from United States v. Goldstein.19
A third major area of exclusion was developed in the cases of
McNabb v. United States20 and Upshaw v. United States.21 These
cases, taken together, establish that illegal detention in violation of
rule 5 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is sufficient
by itself to exclude confessions made by the defendant during that
illegal detention. This infirmity may carry over to a later confes-
sion made while in lawful custody.22 It also appears well settled that
physical evidence acquired during illegal detention must be ex-
cluded.23
A common strand runs through each of these three areas: Other-
wise relevant evidence is excluded on the sole ground that it was
acquired by the police either as a result of or during some unlawful
action in relation to the defendant.24 There seems to be no sub-
17 Bernstein, supra note 16, at 102-03.
1 8Ibid.
10 316 U.S. 114 (1942), affirming 120 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1941). Goldstein held that
the defendants did not have standing to object because they were not parties to the
conversations used to induce the witnesses to testify. The oral testimony of the
witnesses at trial was free from any taint of wire-taps. They testified from memory
and no wire-tap information or evidence derived therefrom was used to refresh their
recollection. Still, the Supreme Court indicated that objection by a party to the
wire-taps would have made the testimony inadmissible. See Weiss v. United States,
308 U.S. 321 (1939), in which the prosecution unsuccessfully attempted to get wire-tap
transcripts in evidence through witnesses induced to testify by confronting them with
wire-tap information. In this case, the defendants had standing to object because
the evidence was the subject matter of conversations to which they were parties.
20318 U.S. 332 (1943). See generally MCCORMICK, op. cit. supra note 2, § 118.
.335 U.S. 410 (1948). See Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); Hogan &-
Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale and Rescue, 47 GEo. L.J. 1 (1958);
Inbau, The Confession Dilemma in the United States Supreme Court, 43 ILL. L. Rv.
442 (1948); Wicker, Some Developments in the Law Concerning Confessions, 5 VAND.
L. REv. 507 (1952).
Most states take the position that the fact that a confession was given during a
period of illegal detention is one factor to be considered in determining whether or
not it was voluntary; but it does not make the confession inadmissible per se. See, e.g.,
State v. Archer, 244 Iowa 1045, 58 N.W.2d 44 (1953); People v. Trybus, 219 N.Y. 18,
113 N.E. 538 (1916); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 372 Pa. 266, 93 A.2d 691 (1953), cert.
denied, 345 U.S. 959 (1953); Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 1331-47 (1951).
2 Killough v. United States, 315 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
"See United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948); Bynum v. United States, 262
F.2d 465 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
2 It is an established characteristic of the federal exclusionary rules that the un-
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stantial argument denying that the exclusionary rule applies in all
three instances to both the immediate fruits and the indirect or
derived fruits of the unlawful action.25 With regard to derived
fruits, the critical question is to determine what connection must
exist between the unlawful action and the evidence acquired so as
to make it "poisonous."
The general rule is clearly stated in Silverthorne: "The essence
of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain
way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before
the Court but that it shall not be used at all."'26 The most recent
statement of a suggested test for determining when the fruit becomes
poisonous was given in Wong Sun.27 In that case one Toy gave in-
formation during an illegal arrest which led to one Yee who stated
that containers of heroin in his possession were given to him by Toy
and Wong Sun. After arraignment, both Toy and Wong Sun made
prejudicial unsigned statements.2  On trial, Yee repudiated his
story and invoked the fifth amendment. The heroin surrendered by
Yee was also introduced into evidence. In determining the admissi-
bility of the evidence, the Court postulated two situations in which
the taint of unlawful police action would not preclude its use: (1)
evidence derived from an unlawful police action would nevertheless
be admissible if the same evidence was also derived from an inde-
lawful police action must violate some right of the defendant before he can complain
about the use of evidence acquired thereby. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471 (1963) (illegal search and seizure); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960)
(standing to object accorded to anyone legitimately on premises where search occurs);
Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114 (1942) (wire-tapping); Edwards, Standing to
Suppress Unreasonably Seized Evidence, 47 Nw. U.L. Rav. 471 (1952). This aspect of
the federal rule is discussed and criticized by Justice Traynor as an illogical introduc-
tion of property and tort concepts into the exclusionary area. Traynor, supra note 9,
at 334-37.
25 But see Wicker, supra note 21. The author states without supporting authority
that in relation to the McNabb and Upshaw cases "the fact that confessions which are
inadmissible often furnish excellent leads whereby the police can secure evidence
that is admissible, militates somewhat against the effectiveness of the defendant's
remedy under the new rules and relieves some of the pressure which that rule places
upon federal officers to comply with prompt arraignment statutes." Id. at 514. This
premise was clearly rejected in Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
21 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920). (Emphasis
added.)
27 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
21 Wong Sun and Toy were released from custody on their own recognizance after
the arraignment. Both made unsigned statements before release. Wong Sun later




pendent source29 and (2) evidence acquired as a result of unlawful
police action would be admissible if the connection between the
unlawful conduct and the acquisition of the evidence had "become
so attenuated as to dissipate the taint."30 In directing its remarks to
admission of the heroin, the Court noted that the police would not
have known about it except for the illegal police action; therefore,
the independent source test clearly was not met.31 However, the
contention was rejected that all evidence is "fruit of the poisonous
tree" merely because the police would not have known about it
except for the unlawful police action. 32 Rather, the Court stated
that the further "attenuated connection" test to be applied was
whether, assuming the primary illegality, the evidence had been ob-
tained by exploitation of that illegality or by some other means
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.33 The
Court held that the following of Toy's illegally obtained instruc-
tions leading to discovery of the heroin was exploitation of the
illegality. 4 On the other hand, the defendant's voluntary return, to
the police station to make a statement after he had been released
from the unlawful arraignment was a "means sufficiently distinguish-
able" to purge the primary taint.35 Clearly the Court thought the
unlawful arraignment did not cause the subsequent voluntary state-
ment. While these tests are not as definite as might be desired they
are certainly sufficient to distinguish most, if not all, of the cases
admitting evidence in spite of its connection with unlawful police
action.36
" Id. at 487; see Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
80 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487 (1963). The implication seems to
be that the "attenuated connection" is one of causation, perhaps analogous to the
doctrine of proximate cause. Compare id. at 491, with Killough v. United States, 315
F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1962). See Bernstein, supra note 16, at 104-08.
31 Wong Sun v. United States, supra note g0, at 487.
112 Id. at 487-88.
" Ibid. See MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 221 (1959).
31 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963).
Or Id. at 491.
80 There are a number of cases permitting admission of evidence having a sub-
stantial connection with the unlawful police action but which was held to have been
acquired either from an independent source or by means sufficiently unrelated to the
unlawful action to be purged of the primary taint. In Payne v. United States 294 F.2d
723 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 883 (1961), a witness independently located by
police identified the defendant during an illegal detention but was still permitted to
identify him in open court. In Bynum v. United States, 274 F.2d 767 (D.C.
Cir. 1960), the court refused to admit a fingerprint obtained during illegal detention
but did permit admission of a fingerprint later obtained from FBI files. The instant
Smith case admitted a palm print of the defendant obtained during a later lawful
detention on the ground that this was a routine part of identification. 824 F.2d at
625:Vol. 1964: 620]
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Applying these general rules to the fact situation in Smith v.
United States, it would seem that the testimony of an eyewitness
discovered directly from the use of information acquired during
illegal detention clearly should have been excluded. As eminent a
jurist as Justice Traynor has so held in the illegal search and seizure
area, relying on the Silverthorne, Nardone and Wong Sun cases as
precedent.37 In Smith, however, the court, while admitting the di-
rect exploitation of the illegally obtained confessions in discovery
of the witness, used the "individual human personality whose attri-
butes of will, perception, memory and volition interact to determine
what testimony he will give" 38 to erect a wall of "attenuated connec-
tion" between the unlawful action and eventual testimony.30 If a
wall is to be erected on the basis of the human personality, at what
point will it be called into play? Wong Sun indicates that the per-
sonality of the defendant himself will not attenuate the connection.
Certainly the attenuated connection does not arise when the witness
is a police officer who took part in the illegal action.40 It does not
seem likely that testimony of a witness discovered during the actual
perpetration of the unlawful police conduct would be admissible.41
It is doubtful that testimony of witnesses induced to testify by con-
frontation with illegally obtained evidence would be admissible in
the face of an objection by a defendant with standing to object.42
882. Watson v. United States, 234 F.2d 42 (D.C. Cir. 1956), held a confession was not
invalid unless the illegal detention produced the disclosure.
The evidence may be allowed because it is determined that it had no connection
with the unlawful action. See United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65 (1944) (confession
obtained before unnecessary delay); Lockley v. United States, 270 F.2d 915 (D.C. Cir.
1959) (confession obtained before unnecessary delay); Haines v. United States, 188
F.2d 546 (9th Cir. 1951) (defendant has burden of showing unnecessary delay). Illegally
obtained evidence may be admissible for a collateral purpose, e.g., impeaching de-
fendant's credibility. See Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954); compare Agnello
v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925). Reversal for admitting illegally obtained evidence
may be refused where there would be no practical change in sentence, e.g., where
sentence for counts not depending on illegal evidence ran concurrent with sentence
for counts supported by illegal evidence. See Heinecke v. United States, 294 F.2d
727 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
37 People v. Mickelson, 59 Cal.2d 448, 380 P.2d 658 (1963).
88 324 F.2d at 881.
39 Ibid.
40 See Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956); McGinnis v. United States, 227
F.2d 598 (1955).
l See People v. Mickelson, 59 Cal.2d 448, 380 P.2d 658 (1963); People v. Albea, 2
Ill.2d 817, 118 N.E.2d 277 (1954); Annot., 41 A.L.R.2d 895 (1955); cf. Jones v. United
States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), which extends standing to object to admission of illegally
obtained evidence'to "anyone legitimately on premises where a search occurs." Id. at
267.
42See Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114 (1942); Weiss v. United States, 308
U.S. 321 (1939); Bernstein, supra note 16, at 102-03.
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Had witness Yee in Wong Sun not decided to repudiate his story and
plead the fifth amendment his appearance as a witness would have
permitted the Court to rule directly on the status of his testimony.
Even without a direct ruling on the point, it seems that the Court
would not have viewed the connection attenuated where the same
exploitation of the illegally obtained evidence that demanded ex-
clusion of the heroin also led to witness Yee. 4 3 As a practical matter,
admission of the testimony of Yee would have made the exclusion
of the heroin meaningless. This anomalous situation would always
exist where the witness also had relevant physical evidence in his
possession.
Assuming agreement with the policy supported by the exclusion-
ary rules, there appears no sound basis for the Smith case distinction
between living persons and inanimate objects. The exploitation of
the illegally obtained confessions up to the point of discovery of the
witness is clear and direct. Further exploitation can only be sus-
pected from remarks of the circuit court" and a general knowledge
of police interrogation practices when they are armed with complete
knowledge of the crime and the persons involved.
11 It is not clear from Wong Sun whether a direct line of causation can ever be
attenuated once the illegally obtained evidence is exploited to find secondary evidence.
See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963), where a voluntary human
act intervening between unlawful conduct and acquiring physical evidence did not
attenuate the connection. At least this would indicate that the "human personality"
does not break the chain of causation. See 324 F.2d at 884 n.6 (dissenting opinion). The
sequence of events in Wong Sun were: (1) illegal arrest, (2) statement by Toy during
illegal arrest which led directly to Yee, (3) agents followed the leads given by Toy
and found Yee, (4) Yee went to his bureau and took out a container of heroin which
he gave to the agents, (5) Yee explained his possession of the narcotics by implicating
Toy and Wong Sun as sellers of narcotics. The Court excluded the heroin because
it was found by exploiting the illegally obtained statement from Toy. Witness Yee
was found the same way. Perhaps the connection could be attenuated by changing
the direct chain of causation. For example, if the agents had acquired nothing from
Yee and Yee had voluntarily gone to the agents several days later with the narcotics
and his story, the connection might well be attenuated. For state court cases dealing
with exploitation of illegally obtained evidence involving witnesses see note 12 supra.
" In Smith the position of witness Holman in relation to the crime should be kept
in mind.- He evidently accompanied the defendants as a partner in their unlawful
venture. It is highly unlikely that he had forgotten the details of a murder he had
watched. Yet the court cites Holman's reaction to police interrogation as an illustra-
tion of the "unique human process" which should attenuate the connection between
the confessions and eventual testimony: "This is illustrated here by the circumstance
that when initially located Holman gave no information adverse to appellants; only
after reflection and the interaction of these faculties of human personality did Holman
eventually relate to the jury the events of the night of the killing. These factors in
part account for the rule allowing a party to cross-examine his own witness on a
claim of surprise and ultimately to impeach his own witness." 324 F.2d at 881 n.2.
This would seem to indicate that not only did the police use the illegal confessions
Vol. 1964: 620]
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Any conclusions drawn concerning the result in the Smith case
ultimately confront the wisdom of the policies underlying the ex-
clusionary rules. It is virtually unanimously agreed today that the
exclusionary rules are designed neither to punish police officers'6 nor
to let the guilty go free. Except insofar as required by constitutional
and statutory safeguards, they are not intended to discourage effec-
tive police investigation.46 The goal is to discourage police from
using unlawful means to acquire evidence.47 The courts apparently
feel that the exclusionary rules are the best devices available to them
to accomplish this goal.48 Use of the exclusionary rules assumes that
the police are primarily interested in convictions, 49 and modern in-
vestigative methods largely make the use of unlawful action unneces-
sary to accomplish this purpose. 0
In the final analysis disagreement with the exclusionary rules is
founded on a basic disagreement with constitutional and statutory
policy.5x The policy manifested in the exclusionary rules certainly
interferes with police investigations. It can easily be argued that the
to discover Holman, but also, perhaps the knowledge imparted to the police by the
confessions was used to "refresh his memory" and to induce him to testify.
"15See Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410, 414-37 (1948) (dissenting opinion);
People v. Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434, 443, 282 P.2d 905, 910 (1955); Traynor, supra note 9.
"Effective police investigation has been the subject of much research and argu-
ment. See generally Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violation of Individual Rights,
39 MINN. L. Rxv. 493 (1955); Paulsen, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Third
Degree, 6 STAN. L. REv. 411 (1954); Paulsen, Safeguards in the Law of Search and
Seizure, 52 Nw. U.L. RFv. 65 (1957); Plum, Illegal Enforcement of the Law, 24 CORNELL
L.Q 337 (1939).
"7 See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486 (1963); Rea v. United States,
350 U.S. 214 (1956); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64-65 (1954); McCoRMICK,
op. cit. supra note 2, § 138; Traynor, supra note 9, at 334-35.
,8 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Killough v. United States, 315 F.2d 241,
245-46 (D.C. Cir. 1962); United States v. Pugliese, 153 F.2d 497, 499 (2d Cir. 1945) (L.
Hand, J.); Nueslein v. District of Columbia, 115 F.2d 690 (D.C. Cir. 1940); People v.
Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955) (Traynor, J.); Traynor, supra note 9, at
334-38. For summary of other remedies against police and their use see McCoMICK,
op. cit. supra note 2, at § 138 nn. 5-7.
49 See People v. Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434, 448, 282 P.2d 905, 913 (1955); see generally
authorities cited note 46 supra One writer using limited empirical data suggests that
the exclusionary rule is most effective in discouraging illegal searches in cases Involv-
ing serious offenses where conviction is important. Conversely, where the police believe
that a policy of harrassment is an effective means of law enforcement, the exclusionary
rule will not keep them from using unlawful methods. See Comment, 47 Nw. U.L.
REv. 493, 496-99 (1952).
50 See, e.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 218 n.8 (1960); Traynor, supra
note 9, at 323.
51 See Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 453 (1957); McNabb v. United States,
318 U.S. 332, 343-44 (1943); Killough v. United States, 315 F.2d 241, 446-48 (D.C. Cir.
1962); People v. Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434, 438-39, 282 P.2d 905, 907 (1955); Traynor, supra
note 9, at 322. The policy reason supporting the requirement for taking an arrested
[Vol. 1964: 620
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present rules go too far in hampering efficient police investigation.5 2
It can also be expected that many judges will view the freeing of
an obviously guilty defendant with alarm when evidence remote
from the unlawful action must be excluded. On the other hand, it
is arguable that once the constitutional and statutory rights are
formulated by proper authority the consequences in court should not
be different than they would have been had police used lawful
methods. 53 The problem is one of balancing individual rights with
public safety.54 The courts have definitely leaned toward protection
of individual rights on the theory that adequate means still remain
for maintenance of high standards of public safety. The "poison
fruit" doctrine is a substantial part of the structure designed to
safeguard the individual against arbitrary police action. A few ex-
ceptions have been necessary,5 5 but it is submitted that the direct
causal connection between the unlawful detention and the discovery
of the eyewitness in Smith should foreclose an exception in this case.
person before a committing magistrate without unnecessary delay is to advise him of
his rights under the circumstances. FED. R. Ca M. P. 5 (b) provides: "The commissioner
shall inform the defendant of the complaint against him, of his right to retain
counsel and of his right to have a preliminary examination. He shall also inform the
defendant that he is not required to make a statement and that any statement made
by him may be used against him. The commissioner shall allow the defendant reason-
able time and opportunity to consult counsel and shall admit the defendant to bail
as provided in these rules."
12See Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410, 414-37 (1948) (dissenting opinion);
McNabb v. United States, supra note 51, at 347-49 (dissenting opinion); 8 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2184 (3d ed. 1940); Comment, 42 Mlcii. L. REv. 679 (1944). See generally
Inbau, supra note 21; Wicker, supra note 21; Wigmore, supra note 8.
53 Wigmore's hostility to the Weeks exclusionary rule was satirically demonstrated
in his now famous "Titus-Flavius" verse ridiculing solving the illegal search and
seizure problem by leaving unpunished criminal Titus and Marshal Flavius. 8 WIG-
moRE, EVIDENCE § 2184a n.1 (McNaughton rev. 1961). A not so well known but equally
pointed rejoinder soon followed: "Titus, your house has been searched illegally and
in violation of the rights guaranteed you by the Constitution. Your papers and docu-
ments have been carried away by one who has thus put himself in the position of a
criminal. But we will not return to you your papers. We, as duly authorized and
constituted tribunal of the State, will accept and use against you the fruits of viola-
tions and illegality. However, we will threaten Flavius, the Marshal who thus violated
your rights, with jail and other punishment, and we hope that this will be some
comfort to you, though we, in fact, know that the officer will not be punished; for,
if we did seriously punish him, he would cease to seize papers and documents unlaw-
fully and we would be hampered in the prosecution of such criminals as yourself."
Letter From Hall to the American Bar Association Journal, Aug. 12, 1922, 8 A.B.A.J.
646, 647 (1922).
"' See Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410, 434-37 (1948); Nardone v. United
States, 308 U.S. 338, 339-40 (1939); Killough v. United States, 315 F.2d 241, 246-47
(1962); MCCORMICK, op. cit. supra note 2, § 138.
" See note 36 supra.
Vol. 1964: 620]
